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Abstract—
Cybersecurity is a concern of growing importance as internet
usage continues to spread into new areas. Strong authentication
combined with accountability is a powerful measure towards indi-
viduals’ protection against any type of identity theft. On the other
hand, such strong identification raises privacy concerns. In this
paper, we argue that authentication, accountability and privacy
can be combined into a single, deployable identity management
system which can be adopted to current citizenship database
infrastructures. More specifically, we present the properties that
such a system would need in order to meet the applications of
current infrastructures, aid in general operations of day to day
life, and take into consideration the privacy of individuals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, the online and offline worlds are converging.
Not only do they rely on one another; requirements for
one often become requirements for the other. One place this
has been seen is authentication: people need to authenticate
themselves both to computer systems and to other people or
organizations. While there are definitely challenges [KM03],
there is sufficient commonality that some people have sought
to combine the two. In particular, the suggestion has been
made that a single credential could serve as a login token —
“something you have” — and as a national identity document
as well. Either alone is difficult (see [KM02] for a discussion
of some of the issues with national identity documents);
combining the two complicates the issue even more.
The need desire for national identity documents is often
driven by the perception that they aid in law enforcement,
national security, or effective border control. Many countries
already have such documents; some of those that do not, such
as the United States [H09] and the United Kingdom [B09],
are considering introducing them.
In the online world, the advantages of token-based au-
thentication to computer systems have long been known.
A recent major report Securing Cyberspace for the 44th
Presidency [L08], though, took it further: it asserted that for
nationally-important systems (such as government systems or
those connecting to critical infrastructure computer networks,
such as those controlling the power grid), a token tied to a
real person was essential. Furthermore, the report said that
“the United States should allow consumers to use strong
government-issued credentials . . . for online activities, consis-
tent with protecting privacy and civil liberties”.
From the report, it is quite clear that such an identity
system is little more than a digitally-enabled national identity
document. In this paper, we take no position as to the intrinsic
merits (or the lack thereof) of such a scheme; those interested
in some of the issues should consult [KM02]. (A broader
critique of the report may be found in [B08].) That said, if
the report’s caveat — “consistent with protecting privacy and
civil liberties” — is to be met, we need to define the privacy
requirements of such a system. That is the purpose of this
paper.
A. Criteria
Cybersecurity vs. Authentication. Cybersecurity aims
to provide a combination of confidentiality, integrity and
availability of the data exchanged over the internet. This is a
concern of growing importance as internet usage continues to
spread into new areas. More specifically, it is apparent that
lack of data integrity or confidentiality in online activities
such as bank account management or medical record logins
would have serious ramifications both in finance and integrity
of personal data, which may may lead to identity theft. It
is becoming increasingly clear that we will move towards
mandatory strong authentication as a means to securing
online interactions for critical cyber infrastructures, a point
raised in [L08]. This would require new means of personal
identification and authentication that require no passwords,
offer accountability, and protect against weak impersonation
attacks (masquerade attacks based on acquired personal
information).
Strong Authentication vs. Id-based centralised
system: Growing Privacy Concerns. Accountability
and authentication are non-trivial requirements in a system,
and difficult to achieve in conjunction with protection of
confidentiality. Authentication means that each individual
has provable identity, while accountability means that
misbehaving individuals are identified. Because of these
needs, it is evident that we are moving towards the universal
institution of “strong government-issued credentials”, which
will be used in every online transaction activity (online
banking, signing up with an ISP) of importance1. However,
a centralized authentication scheme of this nature threatens
individual users’ privacy, as activities could ultimately be
traced back to a single individual.
subsectionOur Contribution. In this paper, we explore issues
related to the combination of the three properties, Authenti-
cation, Accountability and Privacy, into a single deployable
1We may consider important every infrastructure which involves money or
exchange of confidential information
identity management system. More precisely, we will focus on
the requirements and restrictions that would need to be met to
satisfy the conflicting goals of user privacy and confidentiality,
and security in the face of a card-based identity management
system that addresses all current financial activities ranging
from online purchases to taxation and employment.
B. Organization.
In the following section we will describe the main attributes
of the proposed system, including the entities from which it
consists of. In section III we will refer to the collaboration
opportunities and motives each one of the system’s entities
may have against our requirements, while in IV we specify
our requirements for each user-activity. In the two last sections,
we deal with other issues making the deployability of such a
centralized systen more difficult in real world; we also provide
an overview of previous work on the topic.
II. THE CONCEPT OF A CENTRALIZED
PRIVACY-PRESERVING CREDENTIAL SYSTEM
As mentioned above, our goal is to present the issues arising
from the need to combine authentication, accountability and
privacy in a single system that will be used in the real world.
More precisely, we will refer to a system where individuals
have a single identity, register with a public authority, and
obtain government-issued credentials. These credentials can
be used by the individuals to participate in a number of
real-world interactions. These interactions include — without
being limited to — the most important (id-based) activities of
an individual, such as handling of employment, management
of bank accounts, fair and accurate income tax reporting, fair
credit score update, verification of specific attributes of the
individual — for example, that the individual is above the
drinking-age limit — and registration in multiple online or
offline clubs, associations or services.
In order to cover the most common activities, a central-
ized identity management system would need to include the
following entities:
• Users, who may interact with other users or organizations
in order to perform various tasks. Users represent the
citizens and other residents of a country.
• Employers, who form employment relationships with
users and are responsible for reporting income and cor-
responding tax withholding. Employers may be any type
of real-world employers.
• Banks, who allow users to open (possibly pseudonymous)
accounts for the purpose of storing cash and handling
financial transactions. They are responsible for reporting
interest for income tax purposes.
• The Registration Authority (RA), which is responsible for
registering the legal users and manages the construction,
modification, and destruction of government-issued users’
credentials. Given the fact that users represent a country’s
citizens, RA may represent the official citizens’ registry,
i.e., Social security office for USA.
• The Tax Authority (TA), which is responsible for ensuring
that correct income taxes are paid by all users.
• Non-financial organizations, who may wish to extend
membership to users and are not responsible for tax
reporting. Such organizations may be hospitals, gym cen-















































Fig. 2. Chain of procedures in the Identity Management System.
Fig.1 gives a high level view of the current interactions
between the entities, showing the series of transactions in
current identification systems. Citizens collaborate with an
authority similar to RA to issue a national identity card, which
they use later on to open accounts in banks, to be employed
and receive their payments, and to prove their age. However,
we can see that in online communications — and if payment
is guaranteed wherever required — proof of identity is not
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required (i.e., to obtain membership to a website). In this
way, users suffer no consequence if behaving dishonestly, i.e.,
if they visit a site they are not supposed to visit or if they
steal confidential information. In order to deal with this, we
suggest the architecture given in fig.2. In this architecture, each
valid user interacts with RA to obtain credentials stored in an
identity card IDC. Each user with an IDC can prove his valid-
ity without revealing his entire identity, open bank accounts,
register to many other online and offline organizations, while
being held accountable for misbehavior, depending on each
organizations’ policy. In the following section we will describe
specific requirements of the proposed system in greater detail.
A primary goal of a privacy-preserving system is the a way
to avoid unnecessary linkage. That is, it should be impossible
for anyone, in the public or private sectors, to determine if
two different uses of an identity card correspond to the same
individual. At the same time, legally-required auditing and
reconciliation (such as for income taxes) should be able to
take place.
III. A “REAL WORLD”-BASED THREAT MODEL
Our real world deployability assumption defines our threat
model completely. In particular, we assume that
• Users may try to cheat. A user may try to avoid paying
taxes or paying for his purchases, lie for not having
received his payment. In addition, a user may try to
impersonate other users to use their funds (impersonation
attack) or frame other users to appear guilty for the
his malicious actions. Under the aforementioned assump-
tions, we further assume that a user is motivated enough
to attempt any type of forgery.
• Banks are “honest but curious”. Aiming to maintain
their clientele, banks are trusted to perform all their
functional operations correctly, i.e., they issue creden-
tials, open and update accounts as instructed by their
customers. On the other hand, we assume that banks may
use the information they possess for their customers for
other reasons, i.e., to sell credit card based profiles to
advertising companies, while they may collaborate with
tax authority or employers to reveal the identity behind
a (swiss) anonymous account.
• Employers may be either “honest” or “malicious”. In
the general case of powerful employers, we assume
“honesty” in payments towards the users, while they may
try to avoid paying taxes properly. On the other hand,
smaller employers may try to avoid paying employees on
time or avoid paying amounts due to former employees.
• Tax (TA) and Registration (RA) Authorities are consid-
ered to be “honest”, as we assume that they are operated
by the government who wants to protect honest users.
However, they are not assumed to protect privacy; indeed,
there have been a number of incidents in the U.S. of
privacy violations by tax authorities or by unscrupulous
individuals employed by the tax authorities.
• Online Commercial Websites are considered to be “hon-
est but curious”. They have to be “honest” in their func-
tional operations to attract more users, while they use any
related internet-provided information and collaborate with
other websites to trace individuals’ transaction activity.
This is particularly beneficial for targeted ads’ techniques,
which base their ad-efficiency on ads’ relevence to users’
profiles.
• All entities may collaborate only with governmental per-
mission.
Having mentioned what our assumptions are regarding the
entities in a centralized privacy preserving identity manage-
ment system, in the following section we will elaborate on
the specific requirements of the proposed system.
IV. MORE SPECIFIC “REAL WORLD”-BASED
REQUIREMENTS: HOW ideal AND reality ARE COMBINED
Authentication, Accountability, Privacy and Deployability
are the fundamental requirements of the system proposed.
Authentication requires making sure that each party in the
system cannot lie about who he is. Accountability requires
that misbehaving parties are traced and punished. Deploya-
bility is reflected on the assumptions we made on our threat
model, which represent the real world environment, as well as
on the system’s applicability requirement. More specifically,
we require that the identity management system should be
designed in a way so that it scales for large systems, while
it takes in consideration most financial activities of current
citizens, ranging from banking, taxation, to ecommerce. Pri-
vacy requirements, in the context of a centralized identity
management system with so broad range of activities, can
be restricted as to honest citizens’ activity untraceability with
respect to all the entities. In particular, we require that honest
users’ activities should not be to be traceable — or even linked
one to the other as done by the same individual — without
the latter’s concent.
In what follows, we will elaborate on each of our core
requirements in the context of the of users’ most importatn
financial activities, i.e., Bank Account Management, Taxation,
Employment and Registration to other online services.
General ID System Requirements. First of all, as we
require a centralized strong authentication scheme, each
identity should be ultimately uniquely identified. In particular,
we require that each user U in our system
1) interacts with the RA once to issue a single valid identity
card. We will refer to this card as IDC. Privacy requires
that IDCs are created with citizens’ collaboration such
that only them can reissue tham. The requirement for
the one-to-one correspondence between users and IDCs
resembles the way current citizenship logs operate:
each citizen is only registered once to his country of
citizenship. As birth certificates or current citizenship-
related identity cards, IDCs should be enough to prove
users’ validity. (We recognized that this is a very difficult
process. Solving it is outside the scope of this paper;
we assume that governments have sufficient motive for
doing it reqardless. Again, see [KM02] for some of the
issues.)
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2) should not be able to create an IDC by himself or by
collaborating with any other U or organization (IDC-
unforgeability). This requirement is linked to the per
person uniqueness of the IDC.
3) should be the only one able to prove ownership of his
IDC. In current identity systems, this is achieved through
the photo attached to the ID card. However, as we want
IDCs to provide no information regarding its owner to
any unauthorized third party, photos cannot be used in
this case.
4) can demonstrate ownership of his IDC multiple times,
in a way so that no one can reveal U’s name (untrace-
ability). In addition no one should be able to link two
IDC ownership demonstrations as been originated by the
same user (unlinkability).
5) may use his IDC in order to prove specific attributes
related to himself without revealing anything more than
what required. Attributes of this type may be his age
or adulthood in bars in various countires, his driving
license, or his criminal record.
6) may use his IDC to obtain membership to different
types of services, i.e., online customer services, banks,
football clubs, etc. In fact, depending on the type of
the organization and the corresponding user-registration
procedure, organization-issued membership credentials
may be linked to its members’ IDC. In this way
local misbehavior of a member will lead to overall
user-identification.
Bank Account Management. In terms of user interaction with
banks, we require that
1) each valid user should be able to open no more bank
accounts than the ones he is entitled to open based
on his financial status. For privacy purposes, we may
consider enabling the bank system to support two types
of accounts:
• Anonymous but traceable accounts, namely ac-
counts which cannot be linked to a particular iden-
tity and more specifically to their owners, but whose
activity may be observable by the bank — i.e.,
through credit cards. It is critical that anonymity
in this case does not violate the accountability
requirement. Users should only be able to open such
accounts if they are financialy eligible to, while they
should be taxed accordingly.
• Accounts with someone’s name attached, which are
similar to the accounts currently supported by most
banks.
2) An account’s ownership should be able to be revoked or
changed in the following cases:
• its owner dies; user’s inheritors should be provided
access to their heritage.
• its owner is in serious debt to the bank, because of
i.e., credit card use.
3) A user should be taxed on the overall amount of
money he keeps in a bank regardless of in how many
accounts his savings are distributed. In the special case
of anonymous accounts, taxation should be done in a
way so that no privacy breach is caused.
Employment. It is likely that complete user anonymity is not
an issue towards employers. Employers do need to know the
full identity of their employees. In fact, in some extreme cases
of national security organizations, details of the personal life
of the individual are necessary to decide for that individual’s
credibility. Consequently, the privacy definition in the context
of users’ employement systems is restricted to the avoidance of
any bank-account privacy breach due to employers’ interaction
with the banks or taxation authority throughout employees’
payment and taxation respectively.
In particular, we require that payment proceeds in such a
way that the employer-bank collaboration will not reveal the
identity of a particular anonymous account to which the pay-
ment takes place. However, the payment should be conducted
in an accountable and fair way. In addition, the employer must
interact with the TA to provide payment information regarding
its employees. No privacy issues arise from this interaction
since both entities know the identities of the users and the
taxes withheld.
Another employment-wise cybersecurity concern is
be access control for specified sites. We emphasize the
common case where we need to have strong authentication
within the company but complete anonymity outside the
company. A typical example for that would be in critical
infrastructure systems: when an employee of a particular
company logs in to a critical infrastructure’s website, such
as a SCADA system, the employee’s exact identity should
be knowable by that particular company’s department, while
for any entity outside the company, the employee should be
hidden among the employees of that department (company).
In any case, it should be possible to trace a misbehaving party.
Taxation. Tax Authority (TA) should be able for each
individual user U to verify the latter’s income, verify that
the appropriate bank-account withholding taxes have been
applied and exempt U— if eligible — from taxes on particular
purchases. Privacy, as in employers’ case, does not require
that TA does not know the identities of the users. However,
we want to enforce that his employment or bank-account
privacy is not compromised through TA’s interactions with
the banks or employers.
Other Online Services. Online services may include
Usubscriptions to various websites, such as magazines, travel
agencies, concert venues, gyms, etc. A user’s medical account
login may also constiture another online activity of his. In all
these cases, we do require that
1) a user’s identity is not revealed, unless with the latter’s
consent.
2) a user’s online activity cannot be monitored, i.e., we
want to enforce that no third party — other than U and
in many cases the online service system — should be
able to link two different browsing or purchase activities
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of the same user. In this way, we want to avoid any user-
profiling without user’s consent.
V. A CRITICAL ISSUE: IDC MANAGEMENT
In the previous section, we discussed the requirements of a
privacy-preserving identity management system in users’ inter-
actions with the various authorities, i.e., banks, tax authorities,
employers, etc. However, the real world nature of this system,
as well as the importance of a user’s IDC to his privacy,
require a special class of privacy-preserving protocols related
to the management of IDCs. More specifically, assuming a
user U who has obtained an IDC, special privacy-preserving
mechanisms should address the following:
1) it should be possible for U to “change” his IDC for
security reasons so that no user-interactions related
information leaks to unauthorized parties.
2) it should be possible for U to reissue his IDC if he
loses it, i.e., he should be able to invalidate his old IDC
and substitute it with a new one. In particular, to avoid
any impersonation/identity theft attacks, the following
procedures should take place:
• recovery of his IDC’s content;
• IDC-loss declaration and automatic blacklistability
of all the U’s registrations with the old IDC; in
this way, we aim to restrict the attacker from using
U’s membership credentials contained in the card or
learn any thing about U’s past activity. Under this
assumption, we need to enforce that IDCs should
have an extra layer of protection so that its owner’s
information is protected from a third party;
• automatic update of all U’s registrations with U’s
new IDC.
3) it should be possible for the content of IDC to be
recovered when U dies or is in an serious medical
condition, but only by authorized individuals.
4) The system should be usable and comprehensible by
ordinary citizens. Too many online systems are too
complex. Here, we are suggesting a scheme involving
many different identities for each person. It is crucial
that people know which identity is being used for each
activity, and to understand the privacy and functional
consequences of the identity selection. The system
should “do the right thing” by default, and without
excess confusion.
All these issues are very important. The real world nature
of our system posits deployability of any protocols suggested
a critical property. Consequently, any mechanism attempted
to address the management of such an identity management
system should be efficient enough to serve many requests at
the same time. When it comes to lost identity cards, citizens
cannot wait forever for their new cards to be issued; at the
same time, the longer the credential blacklisting, takes the
more time an attacker would have to exploit the stolen card.
VI. RELATED WORK
Cybersecurity has been addressed in the past in a central-
ized way. As mentioned before, Sen. Schumer in [H09] has
suggested the need for a biometric-based identification system
to restrict the issuing of fake identities. Many countries are
embedding biometric data in passports, in conformance with
ICAO standards.
There has been some work indicating the problem of online
privacy. In particular, Brands [B00] was one of the first
to provide a big overview of privacy issues caused by the
extended online use of PKI. Brands showed how an ordinary
PKI would enable the construction of public dossiers of each
individual’s online activity. Instead, he provided a series of
constructions of privacy preserving credentials, tickets and
certificates based on blind signatures and zero knowledge
proofs. Camenish and Lysyanskaya suggested in [CL01] a cre-
dential system with guaranteed user anonymity and credential
showing unlinkability.
Although the concept of a privacy preserving identity man-
agement system with so broad range of applications has not
been proposed in the past, centralized identity management
systems applying the primitives of Brands, Camenisch and
Lysyanksaya have been suggested in the past.
Being a prototype of [CL01], Idemix [CVH02] is the most
representative example. In addition, in [CVH02], Camenisch
and Herreweghen developed additional functionality for ser-
vice providers and credential issuers to configure and enforce
resource access control and credential issuing decisions.
Higgins [F] is an open source identity framework, which
enables users to integrate identity and profile information
across various data sources and protocols. In Higgins each
digital identity is represented as a separate, visual iCard,
while its attribute service provides to identities anonymous
but authorized demonstration of their attributes.
The PRIME project [G] is a European initiative for manage-
ment of the multiple identities a consumer may have obtained
through his online interactions in the internet for commerce
operations as airline and airport passenger processes or collab-
orative e-Learning, so that consumer’s privacy is maintained.
OpenID [FPVFOGTOIT] and iCard [JLLP03] Foundation
are examples of frameworks handling many identities of the
same user across different websites. Icard, plugged into a
mobile device serves as the centerpiece that provides enhanced
networking and application capabilities to the mobile host.
As we can see, cybersecurity has been an issue in all the
aforementioned cases. In particular online logins and proof of
particular attribute procession have been addressed in the past
in a centralized way. However, they do not deal with particular
financial operations such as bank account management and
taxation, which require a degree of identification. Similarly,
master identity revocation and update and card loss recovery
are very important real world issues which have not been
discussed in previous work.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the requirements of a centralized
identity management system, where each individual owning
an identity card IDC can perform all his current financial
operations in a privacy preserving nevertheless accountable
way. We claim that such a system may substantially support
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cybersecurity mechanisms though the IDC-based authentica-
tion mechamisms suggested, as IDCs are required to provide
sufficient information to achieve both: their owners’ privacy
— if honest — their owners’ identity revealment when having
misbehaved.
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